



WHOLLY NATIVE TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT:  
THE POSITIVE LIBERTY OF SELF-GOVERNMENT 
TABATHA ABU EL-HAJ† 
The Supreme Court has unequivocally and repeatedly rejected as “wholly 
foreign to the First Amendment” any suggestion that legislatures can regulate 
electoral speech in order to foster political equality.1 The Court is not 
oblivious to the distorting effects on the political process of large financial 
contributions.2 Rather, its reluctance to accept regulation of campaign speech 
in the name of political equality arises out of its skepticism about legislative 
purposes, in this arena,3 and its recognition that its institutional role 
precludes it from devising a measure of adequate political equality, insofar as 
any such measure would be contestable.4 
Professor Deborah Hellman turns that recognition on its head and in so 
doing offers an intriguing and potentially promising avenue through which 
to revisit the regulatory catastrophe created by Buckley v. Valeo.5 The Court, 
 
† Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University School of Law. 
1 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976); accord Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC 
v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2825-26 (2011). 
2 See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 116 (2003) (noting “Congress’s historical concern 
with the political potentialities of wealth and their untoward consequences for the democratic 
process” (quotation marks omitted)), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
3 See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First 
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 467 (1996) (“The Buckley principle emerges not from 
the view that redistribution of speech opportunities is itself an illegitimate end, but from the view 
that governmental actions justified as redistributive devices often (though not always) stem partly 
from hostility or sympathy toward ideas . . . .”). 
4 See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1369, 1385 (1994) (“[T]he problem is to design and implement a workable conception of 
equality without jeopardizing other values.”). 
5 For an incisive account of the regulatory mayhem Buckley brought forth, see Samuel 
Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 
1710-11 (1999). 
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she tells us, was misguided to ignore the existence of a competing positive 
liberty, the interest in determining “how pervasively to extend market-based 
principles of distribution and allocation” to influence self-government.6 
While Professor Hellman avoids offering a textual link for the liberty of 
self-government, a convincing case can be made that the positive liberty 
identified by Professor Hellman is quintessentially a First Amendment 
interest. It is beyond debate that protecting the functioning of representative 
government was, and remains, a core function of the First Amendment.7 
The Amendment cordons off a space for individual and collective liberty 
in order to preserve the possibility that democratic majorities will be able to 
hold elected bodies accountable to the public interest. It guarantees rights in 
the service of preserving the very conditions necessary to vindicate the 
positive liberty of self-government that Professor Hellman elaborates. Those 
conditions go beyond free expression, which does not capture the entirety of 
what is required for representative government to function. 
Freedom of speech and expression is certainly an important precursor to 
self-governance, but it must be paired, at the very least, with protections for 
political participation if democratic majorities are to determine legislative 
outcomes.8 Robust political discourse does not get politicians elected or 
policies enacted. Changes in public opinion must still be translated into 
election results and policy shifts. This requires citizens to undertake political 
acts; they must vote, petition, lobby, and hold meetings, protests, and vigils. 
It also requires some individuals to choose to run for office. 
Put differently, the Amendment protects the conditions necessary for  
self-governance, rather than the freedom of speech per se, as evident by its 
explicit protection of several types of collective political conduct (assembly, 
petition and, by extension, association).9 The speech rights granted to individuals 
under the Amendment, therefore, cannot be so great as to undermine the other 
prerequisites of self-governance.  
Taken together, the above implies, first, that the positive liberty of  
self-government that Professor Hellman has identified is itself a First 
 
6 Deborah Hellman, Resurrecting the Neglected Liberty of Self-Government, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 
ONLINE 233, 233 (2016), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/164-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-233.pdf. 
7  See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 2) (on file with authors), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2676306 (arguing that while each of the “five rights—speech, press, association, 
assembly, and petition . . . has independent significance[,] [t]hey all . . . share a common goal, the 
advancement of democratic self-governance”). 
8 For an elaboration of these claims, see Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Friends, Associates, and Associations: 
Theoretically and Empirically Grounding the Freedom of Association, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 60-74 (2014). 
9 Id. at 62; see also Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, 56 UCLA L. REV. 543 
(2009) (exploring the political origins of the right of assembly and arguing it was established to 
protect social and political practices central to democratic government). 
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Amendment interest.10 Second, it implies that a campaign finance 
jurisprudence true to the First Amendment’s purposes must balance the 
interest in free speech with other elements protected by the Amendment, 
most importantly political participation. 
While Professor Hellman’s critique is powerful, her preferred doctrinal 
outcome is more problematic. Professor Hellman clearly favors a doctrinal 
solution that incorporates some amount of judicial deference to legislative 
judgment on campaign finance law.11 When addressing the objection that her 
proposal “might open the door to extreme incumbency protection,”12 she 
allows for the possibility that the presumption would give way, inter alia, 
when there is clear evidence of entrenchment.13 
A default rule of deference to legislatures with respect to the basic rules 
of democracy (even one that is reversible) requires a willful blindness to the 
realities of the rough and tumble of politics and the powerful incentives to 
entrenchment.14 Courts may not be well suited to adjudicate between 
contested views of democracy, but the incentives legislators have to undercut 
democratic accountability by tinkering with the rules of democracy are not 
theoretical. These incentives explain the adoption of literacy tests, poll taxes, 
and felon disenfranchisement in the early twentieth century and the adoption 
of strict voter ID laws and the ubiquitous use of partisan gerrymanders in the 
early twenty-first century. As a practical matter, the former practices nullified 
the Fifteenth Amendment and established the hegemony of the Democratic 
Party for over fifty years in the South.15 The effects of the latter are still to be 
determined. 
Campaign finance laws are no exception to this phenomenon. When 
rumors surfaced that Mitch McConnell was proposing loosening restrictions 
 
10 It is worth acknowledging that when framed as a First Amendment interest, the liberty 
interest in “insulat[ing] politics from the market” arises out of the interest in preserving the 
conditions necessary for representative government, rather than the legislature’s general prerogative 
to regulate the market and its reach. Hellman, Resurrecting the Neglected Liberty of Self-Government, 
supra note 6, at 235. 
11 Cf. id. at 237. See generally Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing 
Democracy, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1385 (2013) [hereinafter Hellman, Defining Corruption]. 
12 Hellman, Resurrecting the Neglected Liberty of Self-Government, supra note 6, at 238. 
13 See id. at 238-39 (arguing for a role for the courts in “ensur[ing] that [campaign finance laws] 
do not entrench incumbents”). 
14 The Guarantee Clause, which Professor Hellman cites in support of her argument, in this 
respect provides a decidedly imperfect analogy. The reasons to leave to Congress the responsibility 
of deciding whether a State is abiding by its constitutional obligation to provide a republican form 
of government do not in themselves resolve the question of whether Congress should also be the 
arbiter of its own republican qualification. 
15 See generally J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE 
RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880–1910, at 45-82 
(1975); MICHAEL PERMAN, STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY: DISFRANCHISEMENT IN THE SOUTH, 
1888–1908 (2001). 
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on party spending as a rider to the most recent budget bill, it was the 
libertarian Freedom Caucus that spoke out most loudly. It understood only 
too well that loosening the rules governing coordination with candidates 
would strengthen the hand of the party leadership at its expense.16 
Thus, while I am generally sympathetic to the position that some 
constitutional rights are best left to legislative enforcement, when it comes to 
judicial review of the basic rules of democracy, the presumption must be that 
the rules are protective of incumbents, and the traditional rule of heightened 
scrutiny should govern.17 A doctrinal solution that requires courts to assess 
whether the law being reviewed is, in fact, entrenching is impractical: Judges 
are extremely reluctant to air legislatures’ partisan laundry in public. 
Professor Hellman’s liberty interest in self-government, therefore, should 
be proffered as a compelling state interest under a non-fatal version of 
heightened scrutiny. Working within the traditional heightened scrutiny 
approach of First Amendment law admittedly will constrain legislative power 
in ways that Professor Hellman’s preferred deference-based approach would 
not. For instance, recognition of the positive liberty of self-government as a 
compelling state interest is unlikely to justify a per se prohibition on spending 
on electioneering insofar as self-governance requires some space for both free 
political and free electoral discourse. 
What kinds of campaign discourse, then, could be displaced into the 
highly regulated domain of elections in the name of a First Amendment 
interest in securing the conditions necessary to secure a republican form of 
government? Options that might be justified include regulations that are 
likely to increase the representativeness of those who participate either as 
candidates or citizens. 
There is a good argument that capping the amount of money that could 
be spent during an election season would reduce barriers to entry for 
candidates, thereby diversifying the candidates that run for office, just as 
replacing our current system of private financing with a public one would.18 
The sheer cost of running a campaign, under our current system of private 
funding, is a barrier to entry for many individuals. Insofar as it significantly 
limits who is able to participate in politics as a candidate, our system is a 
 
16 See, e.g., Daniel Newhauser & Sarah Mimms, Freedom Caucus to Battle McConnell on 
Campaign Finance, ATLANTIC (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/
freedom-caucus-to-battle-mcconnell-on-campaign-finance/450837 [https://perma.cc/78JB-28KE]. 
17 While it is a fair theoretical point that the question of “[h]ow much entrenchment is too 
much” is “a question for the electorate themselves to answer,” Hellman, Defining Corruption, supra 
note 11, at 1412, in practice, entrenchment precludes the electorate from having its say. 
18 Cf. Spencer Overton, The Participation Interest, 100 GEO. L.J. 1259, 1261 n.3 (2012) 
(developing a state interest in “advancing financial participation in politics” out of various provisions 
of the Constitution and exploring its implications for range of other campaign finance reforms). 
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significant burden on the First Amendment interest in political 
participation.19 In 2012, a victory in the House of Representatives, on average, 
required an outlay of over $1.5 million, while one in the United States Senate 
required over $10 million.20 It is not surprising that when Forbes Magazine 
calculated the net worth of candidates running in the 2016 Presidential 
election, all but three were multimillionaires.21  
The First Amendment interest in self-governance, therefore, weighs in 
favor of regulations to reduce barriers to entry as a candidate. As to the 
perceived First Amendment burdens of capping unlimited private 
expenditures in electoral campaigns, they are largely overstated once one 
recognizes the fallacy in the Court’s viewing the dollar amount as an 
expression of political intensity. As the New York Times recently calculated, 
$300,000 to a billionaire is roughly equivalent to “$21.17 for a typical American 
household.”22 
An interest in self-government might also justify campaign finance 
regulation that seeks to direct the flow of money in elections in ways that 
encourage more robust and representative political participation as citizens. 
Traditionally, such efforts have included proposals to diversify the sources of 
campaign contributions through matching programs meant to increase the 
representativeness of those who finance elections. Campaign finance 
regulations, however, could be structured to encourage voter registration and 
turnout. For instance, an interest in promoting self-governance might justify 
a regulatory scheme that restricted the amount of money Super PACs could 
spend on advertising or the timing of such advertising, but allow them to 
spend unlimited amounts on voter registration, door-to-door canvassing, 
folding chairs for voters waiting on line, or the sort of Election Day barbeques 
and grand fireworks that brought the electorate to the polls in droves in the 
nineteenth century.23 In each case, the question would be whether, in fact, the 
 
19 See id. at 1273-78 (identifying the core problem with the current campaign finance system as 
insufficient political participation); see also Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Corruption Temptation, 102 CALIF. 
L. REV. 25 (2014) (encouraging Larry Lessig to acknowledge that his project suggests that campaign 
finance debates should be reframed as a problem of barriers to political participation). 
20 Sarah Wheaton, How Much Does a House Seat Cost?, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2013), http://
thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/09/how-much-does-a-house-seat-cost [https://perma.cc/S2XN-H87R]. 
21 Forbes Calculated the Net Worth of Every 2016 Presidential Candidate, FORBES (Sept. 29, 2015), 
http://www.forbes.com/video/4516874043001. The three exceptions were Martin O’Malley (net 
worth $0), Marco Rubio (net worth $100,000), and Bernie Sanders (net worth $700,000). Id. 
22 Nicholas Confessore et al., The Families Funding the 2016 Presidential Election, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/11/us/politics/2016-presidential-election-
super-pac-donors.html [https://perma.cc/3FQ7-ESNX]. 
23 See, e.g., Jon Grinspan, Virgins, Booze and American Elections, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/10/opinion/campaign-stops/virgins-booze-and-american-elections.html 
[https://perma.cc/5FZG-W264] (noting that in the late nineteenth century “[m]illions joined in 
boozy elections, often driving turnouts over 80 percent[,]” and further that “[d]emocracy smelled 
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policies adopted further democratic participation in ways that enhance 
democratic accountability and self-government. 
With the rise of what some are calling a new Gilded Age of American 
politics—an era marked by mutually reinforcing extremes of economic and 
political inequality—there is ever-stronger bipartisan demand for campaign 
finance reform.24 While I am increasingly persuaded that it is important to 
regulate the flow of money during campaigns, we should not be naïve. The 
primary effect of limiting the expenditure of money in elections will be to 
displace the political influence of those with money to spend. Even the most 
progressive campaign finance reforms are unlikely to significantly undermine 
the political influence of moneyed interests, as the First Amendment will 
have to protect unlimited political expression in some domain—whether in 
the form of issue advocacy, lobbying, or news media. It is, therefore, 
imperative that any litigation strategy is accompanied by a political strategy 
focused on fostering an engaged, active and informed electorate capable of 
keeping elected officials accountable to the public interest.25 
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